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This paper examines the role of trading and liquidity in a large competitive market with 
dispersed heterogenous information on market-based managerial compensation. The paper recognizes 
the endogenous nature of a firm’s stock price - it is the outcome of self-interested speculative trading 
motivated by imperfect information about future firm value. Using the stock price as performance 
measure means bench-marking the manager’s performance against the market’s expectation of that 
performance. We obtain two main results: first, the degree of market-based compensation is 
proportional to the market depth, which is a measure of the ease of information trading. Secondly, 
using the dynamic trading model of Vives (1995) we show that if the investment horizon of informed 
traders decreases, at equilibrium the managerial e.ort reduces, and the optimal contract prescribes 
stock-compensation with longer vesting period. 
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1 Introduction
Executive and managerial compensation makes ample use of market based performance measures,
either directly via stock and options or indirectly via bonuses for stock appreciation (for a recent
survey of the components and trends of executive compensation see Murphy (1999)). How market
conditions, and in particular liquidity, impact on market based executive compensation is however
still imperfectly understood.
The aim of this paper is to study how the investors’ preferences and their private information affect
the design of an optimal compensation scheme.
We provide two innovative results: the first is that market based compensation is directly propor-
tional to the depth of the market, defined as the inverse of the Kyle (1985) ‘lambda’, a common measure
of market liquidity in the microstructure literature. Secondly, we show that the time preferences of
the market traders affect the effort decision of the managers through their effect on compensation.
The intuition of this result relies on the fact that the presence of risk-averse informed investors with a
short-term horizon drains liquidity from the market and reduces the amount of information conveyed
by the price (Vives (1995)), thereby worsening the moral hazard problem and leading to lower effort
provision (i.e. to a ‘third best’ solution).
The idea that market liquidity is beneficial for the aggregation of private information is widespread
in the microstructure literature and dates back to Kyle (1985). A more liquid market accommodates
more information-based trading and results in more informative prices. This effect was first used by
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) (HT from now on) to show that dispersed ownership is value-enhancing
since it increases the benefits of market monitoring. A more dispersed ownership increases the volume
of trade due to uninformed investors, and this in turn induces a single large inside-monitor to collect
more private information which is useful for the compensation design. Thus, HT obtain that the
degree of market-based compensation is directly proportional to the volume of uninformed trade.
Notice however that their model does not imply, as we do, that the market-based power incentives
increase with the depth of the market, as pointed out by Garvey and Swan (2002)1.
This different empirical prediction of our model compared to HT is actually the result of a funda-
mentally different theoretical approach.
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The argument in HT crucially relies on the costly collection of private information by a sole
large risk-neutral insider. As in other microstructure models (e.g. Kyle (1985)), a higher volume
of uninformed trade increases the value of private information, inducing the informed monopolist to
collect a more precise signal at equilibrium. But if one considers the financial markets as a means of
aggregating heterogeneous, dispersed information via self-interested, speculative trading, it is natural
to assume that the market for information is open: then, a higher value of private information induces
entry of other informed traders. If we allow entry of other speculators the market price converges
quicker to its ”full-information” value (Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)) and the competition among
informed speculators reduces the return on private information. Then, it is not obvious that at
equilibrium traders acquire a more precise signal when the noise in the market increases. Moreover,
Subrahmanyam (1992) shows that increasing the number of informed traders can actually decrease
market liquidity when traders are risk-averse. Thus, if many informed traders operate on the market,
the effect of the volume of uninformed trade on the optimal compensation is not as clear-cut as in HT.
Secondly, in our opinion, another flaw in the argument of HT is the following: the information
in the market is mostly valuable for the owners of the firm, who then have the highest incentives to
collect it. Thus, it seems unrealistic they leave this activity to a single external monitor. This critique
does not apply to our model since it would be impossible or prohibitively costly for the inside owners
to contract with a large number of traders each of whom has some information2.
We overcome these two critiques of HT by assuming that on the market operates a continuum of
risk-averse, informed speculators, each with a single piece of information, which we consider as the
result of an ”entry” game on the market for private information. These competitive traders receive an
informative signal with different precisions on the future value of a share of the firm and they trade
against liquidity traders in a semi-strong efficient market with risk-neutral market makers. The value
of the firm is unknown and it is affected by the unobservable effort of the manager. The principal,
acting in the interests of existing shareholders, offers before the trading starts an incentive contract to
the manager, which is based on the observable future market price, and on the final cash flow of the
firm. We find that the optimal degree of market-based compensation is directly proportional to the
market depth, as measured by the Kyle’s ’lambda’, while the relation with the variance of uninformed
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trade is ambiguous.
A second contribution of our paper is to analyze how the investors’ time preferences impact on
the real decisions of managers through their effect on market liquidity. In order to do this we present
a dynamic trading model in which investors have different investment horizons: either they maximize
their final wealth (we call them long-termists), or they close their portfolio at every trading day,
maximizing its value at the end of each period (short-termists). Due to the liquidity constraint of
the manager, the principal can offer him a contract based only on the market prices, since the final
realization of the firm cash-flows arise too far in the future. We derive then the equilibrium price
process and the optimal compensation package.
To our knowledge, there are no existing papers studying how the liquidity dynamics affect the
incentive design and its feedback on the managers’ effort. We use Vives (1995) to show how the
horizon of the market traders affects market liquidity: investors with short-term trading horizon drain
liquidity since they suffer additional uncertainty over the realization of the next-period market price.
This in turn reduces the information conveyed by the equilibrium price, making it less effective as an
incentive device but, on the other hand, more useful for insurance purposes. We prove that the effect
of short-termism on liquidity undoubtedly makes the moral hazard problem more severe, so that it
becomes more expensive for the principal to induce effort. Short-term preferences by investors on the
financial market then reduce the optimal effort choice by managers whose compensation is linked to
the market price.
The financial literature shows other ways in which liquidity can affect the incentives of a large
outside shareholder to monitor the firm. A liquid market can facilitate building up a controlling block
but it can also hinder monitoring since it allows easy exit (see Bolton and von Thadden (1998)) for
an analysis of the initial ownership structure of the firm and Maug (1998) for an analysis of secondary
trading). The outside stock market can also provide incentives to the managers via take-overs (see
Scharfstein (1988) and Stein (1988)).
Paul (1992) shows that information useful for incentive contracting may not necessarily be useful
for stock valuation and vice versa. The complementarity of market and accounting information is
also the theme in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Kim and Suh (1993) and Bushman and Indjejikan
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(1993). But these papers do not recognize, as we do, that the value of the stock price as a performance
measure is endogenous to the market model, and in particular depends on the liquidity of the stock,
measured by the Kyle ‘lambda’.
Finally, we mention Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2002) who depart from rational, efficient
trading and analyze executive competition when traders in the market-place are overconfident. In
their model, compensation induces a manager to invest in a worthless but risky project in order to
increase the speculative value of the firm. Shares of such a ”bubble” firm will be valuable as one group
of overconfident investors speculates on the resale value to another, differently overconfident group. In
that sense, they offer an alternative, equilibrium contracting view to the more common rent extraction
view on the issue of lavish executive pay in recent times.
The plan of our paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the two building blocks of the model:
the moral-hazard problem and a market model of trading. Section 3 derives the conditions for an
optimal incentive contract. The aim is to recognize that without an explicit model of trading and
price formation, any conclusion about market based compensation remains ad-hoc. Section 4 solves
the market model, defines liquidity and shows how a more liquid stock leads to more compensation
based on the stock price. In section 5 we show that the horizon of informed investors affects market
liquidity, and short-termism has impact on managerial effort and the optimal vesting period. Section
6 provides the relevant empirical evidence. In section 7 we informally discuss the case in which the
principal can contract on the earnings reported by the manager but not on the true ones. This is the
starting point to study how our results are robust to accounting manipulation. Section 8 concludes.
2 The static model
The model analyzes the moral-hazard problem between owners and management inside a publicly
traded firm. Active trading of the firm’s shares in a large competitive market where many traders
have heterogenous, dispersed and imperfect information about the future value of the firm, results in
a stock price that can be included in the managerial incentive contract. The moral-hazard problem
is modelled as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). The market model follows Vives (1995), which
is a version of the standard large market noisy rational expectations model with the addition of a
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competitive risk-neutral market-making sector.
2.1 Agents
There are five types of agents. A publicly traded firm is run by a risk-averse manager (the agent)
whose unobservable effort drives the expected value of the firm. The firm is owned by a risk-neutral
collective of inside owners (the principal).3 They are passive in the sense that they do not trade
the firm’s shares but hold them until the last period when the firm is liquidated. The key economic
problem is that there is a conflict of interest between maximizing the shareholders’ wealth and the
private motives of the manager.
The company stock is traded by three different agents. First, there is a large number of informed
risk-averse traders (rational speculators). Each trader possesses different imperfect information about
the future value of the firm. They make use of all information available, i.e. they also take into account
the information conveyed by prices. Second, there are noise traders who trade for reasons that are
not related to information about the firm. And third, there is a competitive risk-neutral market
making sector. It ensures that the price will be efficient in the sense that it reflects all available public
information.
2.2 Technology, contracting and the sequence of events
The basic model has three dates: t = 0, 1, 2. It ends with the liquidation of the firm for a gross value
v. At the beginning, t = 0, the inside owners (the principal) hire a manager (the agent) to run the
firm and sign a management contract with him.
The contract drawn up at t = 0 specifies three payments to the manager at t = 2. A fixed payment
and two payments that depend on the two observable (and verifiable) variables: the price of shares p
at t = 1 and the net liquidation value of the firm at t = 2. We write managerial income I as:4’5
I = a0 + app+ av(v − a0 − app) (1)
After signing the contract (a0, ap, av) at time t=0, the manager exerts an unobservable effort e at
a private cost c(e) (as usual ce > 0 and cee ≥ 0). His effort drives the expected value of the firm v at
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time t = 2:
v = e+ θ + η (2)
where θ and η are random variables, θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ) and η ∼ N(0, σ2η), that represent sources of noise
outside the control of the manager.6 The first-best level of effort, defined as the hypothetical effort
that the risk-neutral principal would exert himself, is efb = 1
ce
.
At time t = 1 competitive trading by informed traders, noise traders and the market making sector
determines the market price p for the firm’s shares (more on this in section 2.4).
At time t = 2, the gross value of the firm v is realized, the manager is paid income I according to
his contract (a0, ap, av) and the model ends with the liquidation of the firm for a value v − I.
The sequence of events is summarized in figure 1.
- time
t=0
Owners give an incentive
contract to their man-
ager who then exerts un-
observable effort e at a
private cost.
t=1
Investors receive infor-
mation. Trading in a
large competitive mar-
ket results in stock
price p.
t=2
The firm value is realized
v, the manager is paid I
and the firm is liquidated
for a value v − I.
Figure 1: The timing of events
2.3 The moral-hazard problem
The manager’s preferences are represented by a CARA utility function defined over income minus
the (monetary) cost of effort: Um(I, e) = − exp[−rmI − c(e)], where rm is the coefficient of constant
absolute risk-aversion.
There is a conflict of interests between inside owners and the manager since managerial effort is not
observable. Inside owners must choose the incentive contract (a0, ap, av) that maximizes the expected
value of the firm net of managerial income,
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max
a0,ap,av
E[v(e)− I(a0, ap, av)] (3)
subject to the manager acting in his own interest,
e = argmax
e0
E[Um(I(a0, ap, av), e
0)] (4)
and subject to the manager wanting to work for the owners,
E[Um(I, e)] ≥ 0 (5)
where we have simplified the manager’s outside opportunity to zero.
2.4 A competitive rational expectations market
At t = 1 the firm’s shares are traded in a large competitive noisy rational expectations market. There
is a continuum of risk-averse informed traders, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. At t=1, each informed trader
sees a noisy signal si of future firm value v:
si = e+ θ + εi (6)
= v + ξi
where εi are i.i.d. random variables, εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε).7
At t = 1 an informed trader i buys (sells) xi (−xi) shares of the company stock at a price p. One
period later, at t = 2, he closes his position. The price at t = 2 will be equal to the liquidation value
of the firm p2 = v − I. An informed trader maximizes the expected CARA utility of the return on
trading:
Ui(xi) = − exp[−rxi((v − I)− p)] (7)
where r is the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion.
Informed traders have rational expectations, i.e. they use all information available to them. This
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means that they condition their trading not only on their private signal si but also on the publicly
observable price p, which includes other traders’ information. An informed trader’s strategy therefore
maps his private information si into a demand function xi(si, .).
In addition to informed traders, there are noise traders who trade the company stock for exogenous
reasons. Their demand u is assumed to be random according to u ∼ N(0, σ2u) and independent of all
other random variables in the model. The idea is that there are factors other than information that
cause the price to vary, and that are imperfectly observed. Examples are stochastic life cycle motives
for trade, margin calls or requirements for investors to hold certain assets in fixed proportions.
The stock price is determined by a competitive risk neutral market making sector. It observes the
aggregate limit order book, i.e. the joint demand caused by information and non-information trading,
L(.) =
R 1
0 xi(si, .)di+ u and sets the price efficiently:
p = E[v − I|L(.)] (8)
It is well known that a market model with CARA utility and normal random variables admits
a linear equilibrium (which we will compute later in section 4.2). The aggregate order book L will
therefore be a linear function of the price so that the price setting in (8) is equivalent to (semi-strong)
efficient pricing, p = E[p2|p] = E[v − I |p].
3 Optimal incentive contracts
As usual, the analysis proceeds by backward induction. First, we need to solve for the stock price.
Then we analyze the manager’s effort choice and finally we characterize the incentive contract designed
by the insider owners.
Before we start the analysis, we carry out a normalization that makes trading independent of
incentive contracting. We can therefore analyze trading and incentive contracting separately which
greatly simplifies the model. Also, we will initially conjecture a stock price instead of solving the
market game explicitly. That way, it is more transparent how an optimal incentive contract combines
two different but related performance measures to induce managerial effort. It also emphasizes the
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value added of recognizing the endogenous nature of the stock price. Without a model of trading, the
role of the stock price as an performance measure remains opaque and the role of liquidity cannot be
addressed.
3.1 A useful normalization
An informed trader’s demand xi depends on the terms of the incentive contract (a0, ap, av). To see
this, we state the familiar condition that maximizes an informed traders expected CARA utility in
(7) given that his wealth is normally distributed:
xi(si, p) =
E[(v − a0 − app)− p|si, p]
rV ar[(v − a0 − app)− p|si, p]
It will simplify the analysis considerably if we make a trader’s demand independent of the com-
pensation contract so that we can analyze trading and incentive contracting separately. In order to
achieve this, we define pˆ as the price net of contracting:
pˆ = a0 + (1 + ap)p (9)
An informed trader’s demand can then be rewritten in terms of pˆ
xi(pˆ) =
E[v − a0 − ap( pˆ−a01+ap )− (
pˆ−a0
1+ap
)|si, pˆ]
rV ar[v − a0 − ap( pˆ−a01+ap )− (
pˆ−a0
1+ap
)|si, pˆ]
=
E[v|si, pˆ]− pˆ
rV ar[v|si, pˆ] (10)
Note that we can change the conditioning in the expectation and the variance from p to pˆ since
they are informationally equivalent (and we have a linear framework). To construct pˆ from p one only
needs public information.
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Managerial income using the normalized price is given by:
I = a0 + ap(
pˆ− a0
1 + ap
) + av(v − a0 − ap( pˆ− a0
1 + ap
))
=
1− av
1 + ap
a0 +
1− av
1 + ap
appˆ+ avv
= aˆ0 + aˆpˆpˆ+ aˆvv
The normalized contract (aˆ0, aˆpˆ, aˆv) is related to the original contract (a0, ap, av) according to:
aˆ0 =
1−av
1+ap
a0; aˆpˆ =
1−av
1+ap
ap; aˆv = av (11)
The incentive contract is again linear, but now in the gross liquidation value v and the normalized
price pˆ. Furthermore, we can rewrite efficient pricing p = E[v − I|p] using the normalized price as:
pˆ = E[v|pˆ]
which illustrates the consistency of the normalization.
3.2 A conjectured stock price
The stock price in our model is the outcome of trading in a large competitive market. The price
therefore reflects an aggregate e+θ of the dispersed heterogenous information. The price will however
also reflect non-information based trading u. Since our CARA-normal framework admits a linear
equilibrium, we conjecture the price to be given by a linear function of information and non-information
shocks:
pˆ = α0 + αI(e+ θ) + αNIu (12)
Of course, the coefficients α0, αI and αNI are endogenous and interdependent. For example, efficient
pricing means that in equilibrium the expected price equals the expected value of the firm, E[pˆ] =
E[E[v|pˆ]] = E[v] = e∗. This requires that e∗ = α0 +αIe∗. Another issue is that αI could (and in fact
will) depend on αNI .
Until we solve the market game explicitly in section 4.2, we use the conjectured price in (12).
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3.3 Optimal minimum variance contracts
Given the incentive contract aˆ0, aˆpˆ, aˆv, the manager chooses the unobservable effort e in order to
maximize his expected utility of income minus the cost of effort. Since the manager has CARA
utility and his income minus the cost of effort is normally distributed, the problem in equation (4) is
equivalent to:
e = argmax
e0
E[I]− rm
2
V ar[I]− c(e0) (13)
The manager’s expected income depends on his expectation of the price at t = 1 and on firm value at
t = 2:
E[I] = aˆ0 + aˆpˆE[pˆ] + aˆvE[v]
Since the manager knows his own effort choice, he expects the firm value to be E[v] = e. His
expectation of the price E[pˆ] is more subtle since the market price will reflect the informed traders’
inference process about the value of the firm v given their signals si and the information in the
equilibrium price p. The price function that we conjectured in the previous section (equation 12)
implies that the manager expects the price to be E[pˆ] = α0 + αIe. Since we will solve for the
endogenous coefficients (α0, αI , αNI) later, we postpone the detailed discussion of how the manager’s
effort impacts on the share price and instead keep the general notation E[pˆ] for the moment.
The variance of income
V ar[I] = aˆ2pˆV ar[pˆ] + aˆ
2
vV ar[v] + 2aˆpˆaˆvCov[pˆ, v]
is independent of effort. The manager can neither influence the risk of his company nor the volatility
of the company’s share price.
The first-order condition for (13) characterizing optimal managerial effort is then:
ce = aˆpˆ
∂E[pˆ]
∂e
+ aˆv (14)
The condition shows that any appropriate linear combination of market based compensation aˆpˆ and
non-market based compensation aˆv induces the same effort level. Inside owners’ risk-neutrality however
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means that the cheapest way to induce such an effort level is to minimize the income risk borne by
the risk-averse manager. An optimal contract must therefore solve:
min
ap,av
V ar[I]
subject to effort being optimal for manager, i.e. subject to (14).8
The optimal combination of market based compensation aˆpˆ and non-market based compensation
aˆv that minimizes the manager’s income risk and induces optimal managerial effort satisfies:
aˆv[V ar[v]
∂E[pˆ]
∂e
−Cov[pˆ, v]] = aˆpˆ[V ar[pˆ]−Cov[pˆ, v]∂E[pˆ]
∂e
] (15)
The condition admits already two intuitive conclusions. First, holding the responsiveness of price
to effort, ∂E[pˆ]
∂e
, and the covariance between the price signal and the value signal, Cov[pˆ, v], constant,
the incentive contract places more weight on a performance measure if the measure is more precise,
i.e. if its variance decreases. Second, holding the variances and the covariance constant, the incentive
contract places more weight on the stock price if it is more responsive to effort.
3.4 Sensitivity-to-noise ratios
Condition (15) can be rewritten as
aˆpˆ
aˆv
=
∂E[pˆ]
∂e
− Cov[pˆ,v]
V ar[v]
V ar[pˆ]
V ar[v]
1− Cov[pˆ,v]
V ar[pˆ]
∂E[pˆ]
∂e
(16)
which is the ”(adjusted) sensitivity-to-noise” ratio of Banker and Datar (1989) that is popular in the
accounting literature on management compensation (see Lambert (2001) for a survey). It states that
the relative weight on a performance measure depends on the ratio of its (adjusted) sensitivity to its
precision. The precision of a signal is simply its variance.
The sensitivity of a performance measure is a more involved notion. It describes how responsive the
measure is to changes in effort. The sensitivity is adjusted downwards when the signals are positively
correlated. The sensitivity of the price measure (the numerator of the first fraction) is lower if the
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price co-varies more positively with value. The adjustment term for the price sensitivity, Cov[pˆ,v]
V ar[v] , is
the coefficient of a regression of price on value. The intuition is that if value and price move together
a lot, i.e. the regression coefficient is high, then there is ”less room” for changes in effort to show up
in the price.9,10
An appealing feature of expression (16) is that the ratio of the weights given to performance
measures is independent of the characteristics of the manager, e.g. his risk aversion or his private
cost of effort. The reason is that these factors affect all variable incentive compensation in the same
proportion. Due to the non-observability of managerial preferences for risk and effort, this property
is especially valuable when designing empirical tests.
4 Stock price, market based compensation and liquidity
4.1 What information is in the price?
The price given in (12) affects the relative weight of market to non-market based compensation in (16)
through three channels: the noise V ar[pˆ], the covariance Cov[pˆ, v] and the sensitivity ∂E[pˆ]
∂e
.
The noisier the stock price is, the less compensation will be based on the price. Also, a higher
variance of the price reduces the coefficient of a regression of value on price. This further decreases the
weight on the price relative to value. The more responsive the price is to changes in effort, the more
weight is given to it since this increases the sensitivity of the price measure and reduces the sensitivity
of the value measure. Finally, a higher covariance has an ambiguous effect. It increases the downward
adjustment of both, the price and the value measure.
An extra layer of complications is added by the fact that the price depends on both information
and non-information shocks. If the price is more sensitive to either shock, then this increases its
noise. But the crucial aspect for our result is the following: the price responsiveness to effort and
its covariance with value depend only on the information shock. The more the information shock is
impounded in the price, the higher will be the responsiveness of price to effort.
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Substituting the price function (12) into the sensitivity to noise ratio (16) yields:
aˆpˆ
aˆv
=
µ
αI
α2NI
¶
σ2η
σ2u
(17)
The relative weight given to market and non-market performance measures is equal to the ratio of
their idiosyncratic noises
σ2η
σ2u
weighted by a market factor αI
α2
NI
The market factor depends on both
information and non-information trading.
It is clear at this point that we cannot push the analysis further unless one recognizes the endoge-
nous nature of the share price. Only if we bring in a model of trading and price formation, will we be
able to interpret the ratio in (17) and to discuss the role of liquidity.
4.2 Bringing in the market model
This section solves the market model of trading and price formation. It is a version of Vives (1995)
large market rational expectations model with a competitive market making sector. The aim is to
obtain a characterization of the coefficients α0, αI and αNI that determine the price in (12) and the
relative weight of market to non-market based compensation in (16).
Recall that the price is set efficiently by a risk-neutral competitive market making sector upon
seeing the aggregate limit order book pˆ = E[v|L(.)]. The aggregate limit order book is the sum of
the aggregate informed demand
R 1
0 xi(si, .)di and noise traders’ demand u. An individual informed
trader’s demand xi was described in (10). Since we consider only linear, symmetric price functions,
and since the conditional expectation of a normal variable is linear in the signals realization (and the
conditional variance is not a random variable), we can write an informed trader’s demand as:
xi(si, .) = βsi + f(.) (18)
where β is the trading intensity of an informed trader on his private information and f(.) is a linear
function of the price. Note that β and f(.) are common to all informed traders.
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The aggregate limit order book can then be expressed as:
L(.) =
Z 1
0
xi(si, .)di+ u = β(e+ θ) + u+ f(.)
= z + f(.)
where z = β(e+θ)+u is the part of the aggregate limit order book that is informative about the value
of the firm v. This means that the price setting condition pˆ = E[v|L(.)] can be written as pˆ = E[v|z].
The following proposition calculates this straight-forward conditional expectation:
Proposition 1 The market price net of incentive contracting pˆ = E[v|z] is:
pˆ = (1− λβ)e∗ + λβ(e+ θ) + λu (19)
where e∗ is the hypothesized equilibrium effort, e is the actual effort and
λ =
βσ2θ
β2σ2θ + σ
2
u
Proof: In the appendix.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the actual effort e that determines firm value and the
informed traders’ imperfect information about value, and the hypothesized equilibrium effort e∗ that
determines traders’ prior expectation of firm value, must coincide. The price is then pˆ = e∗+λβθ+λu =
e∗ + λz.11
The price is affected by two random shocks. One shock, u, is due to random non-information
trading. The resilience of the price to the order flow, 1/λ, describes the “depth” of the market as
in Kyle (1985): a deep market reacts little to changes in the order flow z. The Kyle’s lambda is an
intuitive and widely used measure of liquidity.
As in Kyle, the measure of market liquidity is proportional to a ratio of the amount of noise trading
to the amount of private information informed traders are expected to have. The market becomes
more liquid if there is more non-information based trading (larger σ2u) and/or if the common shock to
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firm value and informed traders’ signals is smaller (lower σ2θ). The trading model therefore builds on
Bagehot (1971) classic intuition that a market will be more liquid if trading less plagued by adverse
selection.
The other shock, e + θ, is due to the private information of the informed traders. We see that
the price aggregates the dispersed, heterogenous and private information of traders, i.e. demand is
independent of a traders error ξi in measuring or anticipating future firm value. Informed demand is
part of the order flow and its impact on the price depends on the depth/liquidity of the market, 1/λ.
The coefficient β measures an informed trader’s trading intensity, i.e. it is a measure of how strongly
his private information si affects his demand xi.
A complete characterization of the market model requires solving for a trader’s trading intensity
β. The solution is obtained by computing the conditional expectation and variance in (10) using the
price function of proposition 1 and comparing the expression with (18) in order to identify β. The
result is presented in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 A trader’s trading intensity β is given by the solution to the following cubic equation:
σ2η
σ2u
β3 + [1 + σ2η(
1
σ2θ
+
1
σ2ε
)]β − 1
rσ2ε
= 0
Proof: In the appendix.
Unfortunately, a closed from solution for β depends of the roots of the cubic equation. Using the
implicit function theorem however allows us to analyze the comparative statics of β with respect to
the parameters of the model.
Corollary 1 The trading intensity of an agent β increases if there is more noise trading (higher σ2u),
if the trader is less risk averse (lower r), if the common shock to firm value and informed traders’
signals is larger (higher σ2θ) and if the measurement error is smaller (higher V ar[ξi] = σ
2
η + σ
2
ε).
Proof: In the appendix.
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4.3 The role of liquidity
We are now ready to obtain the first main result of the paper by substituting αI = λβ and αNI = λ
into (17):
Proposition 3 The ratio of compensation based on the market price of the company stock at=1, pˆ,
and compensation based on the final value of the firm at t=2, v, is:
aˆpˆ
aˆv
=
µ
β
λ
¶
σ2η
σ2u
(20)
The market factor that multiplies the ratio of the idiosyncratic risks is the given by the depth of
the market λ−1 times the trading intensity of informed traders β. A large market factor means that
the incentive contract should contain more market vs. non-market compensation. A liquid market
directly favors market based compensation. The same holds for a high trading intensity directly and
also indirectly via liquidity.
The intuition is that the stock price aggregates dispersed and heterogenous information about firm
value and hence managerial effort. Since the price is the outcome of self-interested speculative trading,
it overcomes the problem of communicating the information to the principal for incentive contracting.
Although aggregated market information is valuable to the owners of the firm it is not possible for
them to access it. Either because they would have to incur the cost of contracting with a large
number of traders or because no individual trader has an incentive to reveal truthfully his information
without receiving an adequate profit or because their information is ”soft” in the sense that it cannot
be credibly communicated. In other words, the inside owners of the firm free-ride on self-interested
speculation. The information of the market however is not entirely costless. We saw that there is no
information trading unless there is also some non-information trading. But non-information trading
is random and independent of managerial effort. By contracting on the share price, the inside owners
expose the manager to unnecessary fluctuations.
At this point a comparison with the result in Holmstrom and Tirole (their equation (24)) is
instructive. Recall that HT use the variance of the uninformed trade σ2u as a measure of liquidity.
Quite surprisingly, their equation (24) shows that the ratio corresponding to our aˆpˆ
aˆv
is independent
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of σ2u: the uninformed trade affects the optimal weight of market-based compensation only indirectly
through its effect on the endogenous collection of more precise information (a lower σ2ε using our
notation) by a single speculator. This effect is peculiar of a model with a monopolist of information,
as in Kyle (1985), because the trading aggressiveness of the informed monopolist strategically depends
on σ2u. For a constant σ
2
ε, higher σ
2
u increases β (and reduces λ) but the net effect on
aˆpˆ
aˆv
is nil.
If we rewrite our (20) as in HT we obtain:
aˆpˆ
aˆv
=
µ
β2σ2θ + σ
2
u
σ2θ
¶
σ2η
σ2u
=
µ
β2 +
σ2u
σ2θ
¶
σ2η
σ2u
which shows that the market-based compensation is higher when the moral hazard is higher (higher
σ2η and lower σ
2
θ), and when the private signals are more precise (by Corollary 1, β is increasing with
the precision of the private signal). As in HT, σ2u also increases the (ex-ante) variance of the price
(hence reducing aˆpˆ
aˆv
) but at the same time it increases β (Corollary 1). However, contrarily to HT, it
affects also directly the ratio aˆpˆ
aˆv
.What matters for the effect on aˆpˆ
aˆv
is the impact of σ2u on the liquidity
measure λ : in our model with many informed speculators, this is not univocal, hence we cannot a
priori conclude that higher uninformed trade volatility leads to more market based compensation.
It is difficult to obtain explicit comparative statics on the relative weight of market based com-
pensation with respect to the parameters of the model due to the problem of finding a closed form
solution for the trading intensity β. Numerical simulations 12 however show that we can expect more
market based compensation if there is less non-information (noise) trading (lower σ2u), if the common
shock to firm value and informed traders’ signals is smaller (lower σ2θ), if firm’s idiosyncratic risk is
larger (higher σ2η), if traders have better information (lower σ
2
ε) and if they are less risk averse (lower
r).
5 The dynamic model: Market-based compensation and investors
horizon
Proposition 3 states that one of the main determinants for the optimal weight of market-based com-
pensation is the liquidity of the stock, measured by the Kyle’s lambda λ. It seems natural then to
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study how the investors’ behavior affect the optimal effort decision by the manager through its influ-
ence on λ. Up to now we have assumed that the true liquidation value of the firm v is known at a final
stage, when the manager is due his compensation. This assumption is certainly too strong in reality:
the value v, that is the value created directly by the management’s actions (plus shocks outside his
control), produces sometimes well after the end of the managerial contract. Or, alternatively, it is
unrealistic to assume that it becomes publicly observable and verifiable before the managers need to
be rewarded13. These observations in practice preclude the possibility that the principal can contract
directly on v. Since in the present paper we focus on market-based contracts14, when v is not con-
tractible, it is natural to assume that the principal is obliged to compensate the manager according
to the realization of the stock prices observed on the market: she can do this rewarding the manager
with shares of the firm that he can vest at pre-specified periods during his contract.
To study how different market conditions affect the optimal contracting and the effort choices
of the agent, we allow for multiple trading dates: the firm shares are exchanged during two trading
rounds t = 1, 2. The true value of the firm v realizes at date t = 3. In order to simplify the equilibrium
characterization, we assume that v = e+ θ.
As a short-cut that motivates why the liquidation value v is not contractible, we assume that the
manager does not stay with the firm until t = 3. On the contrary, he must receive his payment at
latest at t = 215.
The contract between the inside owners and the manager is signed before trading takes place, i.e.
at t = 0. The contract specifies two payments (a0, a2) such that the manager’s income is I = a0+a2p2
where p2 is the (end of) second-period equilibrium price16; denote with π the net liquidation value of
the firm: π = v − a0 − a2p2, and a2 represents the stock-appreciation rights.
Since the effort is assumed to be unobservable, the moral-hazard problem described before still
holds, and this induces the principal to maximize her objective under the constraint of the manager
acting in his own interest (IC) and accepting the contract (IR).
The manager has a negative exponential utility function with risk-aversion coefficient rm, and the
principal is risk-neutral and maximizes the ex-ante (i.e. t = 0) residual value per-share π in choosing
the optimal contract.
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As before informed speculators i and noise traders operate on the market.
We will consider two alternative cases according to the type of informed speculators:
(i) Long termists: they maximize their final wealth Wi3 =
P3
t=1 πit:
Wi3 = xi1(p2 − p1) + xi2 (π − p2)
where xit > 0 denotes a long position of trader i at time t. Each agent i maximizes a CARA utility
function U i(Wi3) = − exp(−rWi3).
(ii) Short termists: they solve the following problems:
1) at date t = 1:
Max
xi1
EU i(Wi2) = E [− exp(−r (xi1(p2 − p1))) |H1 ]
• 2) at date t = 2:
Max
xi2
EU i(Wi3) = E [− exp(−r (xi2(π − p2))) |H1,H2 ]
where H1 and H2 are respectively their information sets at t = 1 and t = 2. For the interpretation
of short-termists we refer to Vives (1995).
The noise traders demand at each trading date t the random quantity ut ∼ N(0, σ2u), t = 1, 2. The
two noise trading demands u1 and u2 are uncorrelated.
Before the first round of trade all speculators i receive an informative signal si = e + θ + εi.
Note that since v = e+ θ, under this information structure the market as a whole knows exactly the
realization of v in the sense that
R
i
sidi = v. The shock θ is uncorrelated with εi and errors are also
uncorrelated across agents. The precision of the signals is the same across agents (symmetry):
εi N(0, σ
2
ε)
If the investors have a short horizon, either we can assume that they are long-lived and myopic,
or that a new generation is born at date 2 and inherits the private signal received by the previous
generation.
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Market equilibrium
The competitive market-making sector sets the equilibrium prices p1 and p2 as equal to the expected
value of v conditional on the public information, represented here by the order flows.
We denote with
L1 =
Z 1
0
xi1di+ u1
the order flow the market makers observe at date 1, where xi1 is the position taken by informed trader
i at the same date.
Analogously,
L2 =
Z 1
0
xi2di−
Z 1
0
xi1di+ u2
the order flow the market makers observe at date 2, where
R 1
0 xi2di −
R 1
0 xi1di represents the net
aggregate demand in period 2 by informed speculators.
As in Vives (1995), we will concentrate on linear symmetric equilibria, in which the position xit
is linear in the prices pt and in the signal si: xit = βt(si − pt). Define then z1 = β1v + u1 and
z2 = (β2 − β1) v + u2, it is easy to verify that zt is informational equivalent to Lt.
In order to take into account for the dilution effect which affects the net position xi1, the market
makers compute the ”adjusted” order flows bL1 = R 10 bxi1di+u1 where bxi1 = bβ1(si−p1) = 11+a2β1(si−p1),
and bL2 = R 10 xi2di − R 10 bxi1di + u2. The order flows bL1, bL2 contain the informational trades with an
aggressiveness net of the dilution effect due to the managerial compensation: since the contract a2
is public information and at equilibrium market makers know β1, the order flow bL1 does not require
more information than L1. Note that bβ1 measures the information-related aggressiveness corrected
for the dilution effect 1 + a2.
From the presence of competitive, risk-neutral market makers we have:
p1 = E[π |bz1] = E[v |bz1] − a0 − a2E[p2 |bz1] (21)
p2 = E[π |bz1, bz2] = E[v |bz1, bz2] − a0 − a2p2 (22)
From Vives (1995), bz1 = bβ1v + u1 is informational equivalent to bL1 and bz2 = ³β2 − bβ1´ v + u2 is i.o.
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to bL2 Solving explicitly for p2 :
p2 =
E[v |bz1, bz2] − a0
1 + a2
(23)
and taking the expectation E[p2 |bz1] of (23) and substituting into (21) we obtain:
p1 =
E[v |bz1] − a0
1 + a2
(24)
Then we normalize the prices in the following way:
bp1 = (1 + a2)p1 + a0 = E[v |bz1]
bp2 = (1 + a2)p2 + a0 = E[v |bz1, bz2]
We can then find the normalized equilibrium price irrespective from the investors horizon.
Proposition 4 The (normalized) REE prices are:
bp1 = e∗(1− bλ1bβ1) + bλ1bβ1(e+ θ) + bλ1u1 (25)
bp2 = e∗ ³1− bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 − ³β2 − bβ1´bλ2´+ ³bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´ bλ2´ (e+ θ) + bλ1 τ1τ2u1 + bλ2u2(26)
Proof: see the Appendix.
The aggressiveness of informational trade bβt, hence the market depth bλt, depend on the horizon of
the informed speculators. We now solve explicitly for the equilibria respectively in the case long-term
speculators trade on the market and with short-term speculators.
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Equilibrium with long-term speculators
Proposition 5 When long-term investors operate on the market, the unique linear rational expecta-
tions equilibrium coincide with the static case:
xi1 = β1l(si − bp1l) = bβ1l(1 + a2)(si − bp1l) (27)
⇒ bβ1l = τ εr (28)bλ1l = bβ1lτubβ21lτu + τ θ (29)
xi2 = β2l(si − bp2l) (30)
⇒ β2l = bβ2l = τ εr (31)bλ2l = (bβ2l − bβ1l) τuτ2l = 0 (32)
and
τ2l = bβ21lτu + τ θ + (∆β)2 τu
Proof: see the Appendix.
Note that, for a2 = 0, for the long-term investors it would be optimal to trade only once on their
signal, at the first trading round, holding then their optimal position until the end (buy and hold
strategy). For this reason the normalized order flow in the second period does not contain additional
information (the net aggressiveness bβ1l = β2l), and hence, bp2l = bp1l. For a2 > 0 the dilution term
increases the total aggressiveness without anyway changing the depth bλ1 since the market makers
correct the order flow for this effect which is not related to private information. As in (35), long-term
competitive informed traders trade with the maximum aggressiveness on their private signal in the
first trading period: waiting to reveal their signals in the second period is sub-optimal since it gives
the incentive to the other informed speculators to trade according to their signal immediately.
Equilibrium with short-term speculators
Proposition 6 When short-term investors operate on the market, the unique linear rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is
24
xi1 =
1
r
(1 + a2)
τ2τ ε
τ2 + τ ε
(si − bp1s) = bβ1s(1 + a2)(si − bp1s) (33)
⇒ bβ1s = 1r τ2τ ετ2 + τ ε (34)bλ1l = bβ1sτubβ21sτu + τ θ =
bβ1sτu
τ1s
(35)
xsi2 =
τ ε
r
(si − bps2) (36)
⇒ β2s = bβ2s = τ εr (37)bλ2s = (β2s − bβ1s)τu
(β2s − bβ1s)2τu + bβ21sτu + τ θ = (β2s − bβ1s)
τu
τ2s
> 0 (38)
Proof: see the Appendix.
The trading intensity bβt (net of dilution effect) increases across time, and the reason for that is
that short-term traders in period 1 have to forecast p2 in assessing their optimal trading strategy: p2
depends not only on the fundamental value v (on which they receive an information), but also on the
noise trade (that they cannot forecast). Their risk-aversion makes them less eager to play aggressively
on their private signal, because of the additional uncertainty on p2.
5.1 The effect of investors horizon on the optimal contract
In the dynamic setup the manager’s expected income depends exclusively on the price p2, which
incorporates the market’s expectations at t = 2 of the future realization of firm value:
I = a0 + a2p2
= a0 + a2
µbp2 − a0
1 + a2
¶
=
a0
1 + a2
+
a2
1 + a2
bp2
= ba0 + ba2bp2
and the choice of effort by the manager satisfies
max
e
E(I)− rm
2
V ar(I)− k
2
e2
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with V ar(I) = ba22V ar(bp2), independent of effort, and bp2 is given by (26).
The f.o.c. for the effort choice reads:
e =
1
k
ba2∂E(bp2)
∂e
=
1
k
ba2 ³bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´ bλ2´ (39)
This condition is different from (14) in two respects: first, only the market-based power-incentive
ba2 matters for the manager’s choice; second, the sensitivity of p2 with respect to the effort depends on
the dynamic trading strategy of the informed speculators. The more information is conveyed in the
first market price, the higher this sensitivity (see Corollary 2 for a proof of this statement).
Since the principal is risk-neutral, at t = 0 she chooses the contract solving:
max
e;â2
E(v − I)
s.t. e =
1
k
ba2 ³bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´ bλ2´ (IC)
0 = E(I)− rm
2
V ar(I)− k
2
e2 (IR)
Obtaining ba2 necessary to implement any effort e from the incentive compatibility constraint, and
substituting into the objective of the principal the expression for the expected income from the par-
ticipation constraint, we get:
max
e
E(v)− rm
2
V ar(I)− k
2
e2 = e− rm
2
ba22V ar(bp2)− k2e2
⇒ max
e
e− rm
2
k2e2V ar(bp2)³bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´ bλ2´2 −
k
2
e2
and the solution is characterized by the first-order condition:
e∗ =
1
k
1
1 + krm
V ar(p̂2)(
λ̂1β̂1
τ1
τ2
+(β2−β̂1)λ̂2
)2
(40)
The optimal effort, and then the optimal contract, depends on the investors’ horizon, since this affects
the expected volatility of the second period (normalized) price bp2, the aggressiveness of informed trade
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bβt and the depth of the market bλt. The investors’ preferences then produce real effects on the effort
choices of the manager through the design of the optimal market-based compensation.
Corollary 2 (i) V ar(bp2s) < V ar(bp2l). (ii) bλ1sbβ1s τ1sτ2s + ³β2s − bβ1s´ bλ2s < bλ1lbβ1l.
This proves that the t = 2 price in the case short-term investors operate on the market is ex-ante
less volatile than with long-term traders, since the short-term investors are less willing to trade on
their private signal. On the other hand, point (ii) shows that E (bp2s) is less sensitive to effort than
E(bp2l). Hence, from the contracting point of view, bp2s is a less noisy (i.e. better), but less sensitive
(i.e. worse) measure for the effort than bp2l. We can show that the second effect always prevails on the
first, so that the moral hazard problem aggravates in the presence of short-term investors.
Proposition 7 The presence of short-term informed traders on the market reduces the optimal
managerial effort.
We can explain this result as follows. Short-termism, even in an informationally efficient market,
reduces the market depth λ−12 since it reduces the willingness by risk-averse informed traders to provide
liquidity to the market. Indeed, with respect to the case of long-term traders, they face an additional
uncertainty due to the realization of price bp2s, at which they close their position. This effect reduces
the aggressiveness β1 of their demands in the first period, but it increases β2. In other terms, a less
liquid market accommodates less informational trade at equilibrium; hence the price bp2s conveys less
information about e than bp2l, in the sense of being less sensitive to the effort. This aggravates the
moral-hazard problem, so that it is more expensive for the principal to induce a high effort.
Optimal contract
Proposition 7 shows that in presence of short-termists it is more costly for the principal to give
incentives to the manager, when he writes contracts on the second period price p2. This raises the
question whether it would be optimal to reward the manager with stock-appreciation rights based on
the realization of the first price p1. The following argument shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 8 A contract with stock-appreciation rights based on price p2 is preferred to a contract
based on p1.
As explained above, the price p2s contains more information (when short-termists operate) than
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p1s. It represents then a better statistics to infer the effort e. But on the other hand, it is ex-ante less
volatile (Vives (1995), Proposition 5.1). Exactly with the same logic behind the proof of Proposition
7, the first effect prevails, because the market at t = 2 is more liquid than at t = 1 with short-term
investors.
6 Empirical evidence
To the best of our knowledge, the empirical literature on executive compensation has not yet considered
the role of liquidity for market based executive compensation (for recent surveys see Murphy (1999)
and Core, Guay and Larcker (2003)).
The only exception is the recent work by Garvey and Swan (2002). Using stock turnover and the
bid-ask spread as two major measures of liquidity, they find a strong positive effect of liquidity on
the use of stock based pay. Their effect of liquidity on stock based pay is at least as great as that of
size, risk, industry and other control variables. In order to justify their hypothesis about the effect of
liquidity, they refer to the analysis of HT although they acknowledge that the Kyle ’lambda’ has an
ambiguous a priory relationship to the use of stock-based incentives. Moreover, they also recognize
the importance of ownership concentration for their argument. The issue is that ownership can have
its own independent effect on executive compensation via corporate governance channels (see Hartzell
and Starks (2003)). Another problem of using the Holmstrom and Tirole argument for their analysis
is that Garvey and Swan find that larger firms have a lower share price volatility and that share price
volatility is strongly positively correlated with turnover. Both empirical findings are contrary to the
results in Holmstrom and Tirole. None of these caveats applies to our framework.
Less direct evidence on the link between liquidity and executive compensation comes from the fact
that larger firms typically have more stock based compensation (Baker and Hall (2002), Himmelberg,
Hubbard and Palia (1999)). At the same time, it is well known that the stock of larger firms is more
liquid (Amihud and Mendelsson (1986)). Although, it has been argued that larger firms need to pay
more to attract more talented or wealthier managers, it seems that liquidity could also be a possible
explanation.
There is also a debate to what extent incentives are positively or negatively related to risk. On the
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one hand, it is expected that managerial risk aversion causes a negative relationship (Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999)). On the other hand, there are arguments that managerial effort is more important,
or that it is more difficult to directly monitor the manager, in riskier environments (Prendergast
(2002) and Core, Guay and Larcker (2003)). Our interpretation is that the debate has overlooked
the potentially important impact of liquidity, a factor that also depends on risk, on management
compensation.
There is also some evidence that following carve-outs, the management’s equity compensation is
based on the former subsidiaries’ stock (Schipper and Smith (1986)). Our interpretation is that the
carve-out increased liquidity and hence information trading. As a result, more valuable information
is incorporated into stock prices.
Finally, our point of view on the recent wave of corporate scandals and lavish CEO pay in the late
1990s is that the situation represents an inefficient disequilibrium. The market collected little valuable
information and a lot of non-information (noise) trading seem to have occurred, both of which should
have lead to a decrease of market-based performance pay.
7 Discussion: the role of accounting manipulation
In this section we describe informally some results we obtained studying the case in which only market
prices and reported earnings are contractible. During regular intervals, the firm is due to report
her economic and financial results through accounting reports. There is clear empirical evidence
that executives can "manage" earnings (to meet pre-specified targets (Degeorge et al. (1999)) or to
meet analysts’ forecasts (Jensen (2001), Fuller and Jensen (2002)). The reported earnings are clearly
contractible, and most of the compensation packages used in practice include earning-based bonuses.
To check if the results obtained before are robust to this change of setup, we have assumed that
the principal can write a contract on the market price and the reported cash flows, but not on the
true ones.
The results we obtain from the analysis of this variation of the model confirm the main intuition
that market-based compensation depends on market liquidity. But it also produces a new insight of
the effect of liquidity on the degree of manipulation. More precisely, since the market is semi-strong
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efficient, we obtain the same result of the "manipulation game" obtained in Stein (1989), that is
the existence of a perfectly separating equilibrium with inefficient manipulation. At equilibrium, the
managers inflate earnings given that the market expects them to do so, and given this behavior the
market rationally discounts the reported earnings. Observing the public report, everybody can infer
the true earnings, but the managers pay a cost due to their manipulation.
If this manipulation activity does not produce real costs on the final cash-flows of the firm, and
if the "manipulation game" has a unique, perfectly revealing equilibrium, the optimal compensation
contract still puts higher weight on the price when the liquidity of the stock is higher. As a side
effect, the lower the weight on the accounting report, the lower the degree of manipulation of earnings
the manager will operate at optimum. Hence, in firms with very liquid stocks we should observe less
frequently a complex "earnings management".
We leave for further research the analysis of a more detailed model of earnings manipulation in
which possibly other equilibria (partially revealing) exist in the manipulation game (see Guttman et
al. (2004)). We can conjecture that the different weights attributed in the optimal contract on market-
based vs. accounting-based measures have interesting effects on the degree of earnings manipulation
the managers choose.
8 Conclusion
This paper examined the role of trading and liquidity in a large competitive market with dispersed
heterogenous information on market-based management compensation. An important feature of the
model is that it recognizes the endogenous nature of a firm’s stock price - it is the outcome of self-
interested speculative trading motivated by imperfect information about future firm value. Using
the stock price as performance measure means bench-marking the manager’s performance against the
market’s expectation of that performance.
The intuition is that the stock price aggregates dispersed and heterogenous information about firm
value and hence managerial effort. Since the price is the outcome of self-interested speculative trading,
it overcomes the problem of communicating the information to the principal for incentive contracting.
Although aggregated market information is valuable to the owners of the firm it is not possible for
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them to access it. Either because they would have to incur the cost of contracting with a large
number of traders or because no individual trader has an incentive to reveal truthfully his information
or because their information is “soft” in the sense that it cannot be credibly communicated. In other
words, the inside owners of the firm free-ride on the result statistic of self-interested speculation, that
is the market price. The information of the market however is not entirely costless. There is no
information trading unless there is also some non-information trading. But non-information trading
is random and independent of managerial effort. By contracting on the share price, the insider owners
expose the manager to unnecessary fluctuations.
Liquidity essentially measures the ease of information based trading. Our first result is that the
degree of market-based compensation is proportional to market liquidity, which is a measure of the
ease of information trading. From this starting point, we can show that the horizon of the investors
has real effects even in a semi-strong efficient market, since it affects the dynamic pattern of liquidity
in the market.
Although the empirical compensation literature has not yet focused on the role of liquidity, our
hope is that the present analysis adds to the debate on why large firms have more stock based
compensation, whether risk is positively or negatively related to incentives and on how liquidity is an
indirect channel through which market based compensation depends on systemic noise.
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Notes
1“The Kyle ‘lambda’ [...] in the HT model [...] has an ambiguous ”a priori” relationship to the use of stock-based
incentives” (cit. page 7, Garvey and Swan (2002)).
2The debate is a classic one. Already Hayek (1945) noted that:
”the answer to our question will therefore largely turn on the relative importance of the different kinds of
knowledge; those more likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals and those which we should with
greater confidence expect to find in the possession of an authority made up of suitably chosen experts”.
3The assumption is that inside owners can diversify away any firm specific risk while the manager cannot.
4Writing the contract on the net liquidation value v− a0 − app instead of the gross liquidation value v is a modelling
device that allows to abstract from dilution issues (see (20). We conform to the standard practice that the contract is
linear in p and v, I = a0(1− av) + ap(1− av)p+ avv, and that the manager is paid at the final period t = 2.
5 (22) notes that linearity is a good first order approximation of reality. In practice, the convexity induced by option
holdings appears to be negligible. (21) argues that linearity is desirable because it counters manager’s incentives to game
the capital budgeting process.
6One could view our information structure as a reduced form of the set-up in (22). Using the CAPM, he decomposes
firm return into a systemic market return and an idiosyncratic firm return. Moreover, notice that this information
structure is exactly as in (20), in order to facilitate the comparison between our and their results.
7Motivated by the law of large numbers, we will make the technical assumption that
∫ 1
0
εidi = 0 almost surely (see
(35) for a discussion of this assumption). Note that ξi ∼ N(0, σ2ε + σ2η).
8The second order condition is satisfied (cee < 0) and the maximum is a global one. Hence, we can substitute (14)
for (13) in the principal’s problem.
9There is another adjustment in addition to the covariance. A higher responsiveness of measure B to effort amplifies
the downward correction of A’s sensitivity caused by a positive covariance. To see this, consider the sensitivity of the
value measure, i.e. the denominator of the second fraction in (16). Its downward adjustment due to a positive covariance
with price is stronger if the price is sensitive to effort. Again, the intuition is that if effort affects price a lot and price
and value move together a lot, then there it less possible to filter out effort from value.
10As an example, let us suppose that the price of the company stock is its future value plus noise, pˆ = v+u = e+θ+η+u.
We intuitively expect that no weight should be to the stock price. Since price is value plus noise and since the manager
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is paid according to final firm value v anyway, the price is useless for figuring out whether good performance was due to
effort/skill or pure luck.
And indeed, equation (16) results in:
aˆpˆ
aˆv
=
1− σ2θ+σ2θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
θ + σ
2
u
σ2θ + σ
2
θ
1− σ2θ+σ2θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
θ
+σ2
u
= 0
The responsiveness of price and value to effort are the same, i.e. one. Also, the coefficient of a regression of price
on value is one. Together, this means that nothing new about effort can be learn from the price once we observe value.
The example illustrates (18) informativeness principle. The price should not be include in the incentive contract since
value is a sufficient statistic for the joint distribution of value and price with respect to effort.
11 It is important to make the distinction between actual and equilibrium effort. Every actual effort by the manager
creates a set of signals for the informed traders whose demand creates a signal for the market making sector. No one
in the market knows the true effort. Formally speaking, the market game follows an information set that contains all
possible effort levels. A set of beliefs, i.e. a probability distribution over effort, must be associated with that information
set in order to compute the conditional probabilities according to Bayes’ rule. The correct set of beliefs puts weight one
on equilibrium play e∗ since the information set is always on the equilibrium path.
12Available on request.
13See Section 7 for a discussion when the agent knows v privately and he reports it strategically to the market. Only
the reported cash-flow is contractible then, while the true value realizes far in the future.
14 In a previous version of the present paper we considered the case in which everybody can observe a public noisy
signal π (i.e. an accounting statement) on the true value v, where π = v + ς and the noise ς cannot be affected by the
manager choices. This public signal can then be used by the principal in the compensation contract. The result in (16) is
robust to this generalization, hence market liquidity plays the same role described before. An interesting generalization
considers the situation in which the manager can manipulate the signal π with a second effort that changes the noise ς.
15Alternatively, one can also think that the manager is liquidity constrained and he needs money at a date t before
the true value v can be verified.
16 In the following we will show that, if the principal has to choose among a contract written on p1, a contract written
on p2, or a contract on both prices, she will (weakly) prefer the contract on p2.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of proposition 1
In order to calculate the conditional distribution, we use the following standard result for normally distributed
variables:
Result 1 Let Yi be a (ni × 1) vector with mean µi, i=1,2, and variance-covariance matrices Σij, then
Y2|Y1 = y1 ∼ N([µ2 +Σ21Σ−111 (y1 − µ1)], [Σ22 −Σ21Σ−111 Σ12])
Let Y1 = z with mean µ1 = βe
∗ and Σ11 = V ar(z) = β2σ2θ + σ
2
u, Y2 = v with mean µ2 = e
∗ and
Σ22 = σ
2
θ + σ
2
η, and Σ21 = Σ12 = Cov[v, z] = βσ
2
θ. Hence
E[v|z] = e∗ + βσ
2
θ
β2σ2θ + σ
2
u
(z − βe∗)
Letting λ = βσ
2
θ
β2σ2
θ
+σ2u
and substituting for z = β(e+ θ) + u gives the result for pˆ = E[v|z].
Proof of proposition 2
It will be easier to calculate the conditional expectation if we use the following information equivalent of price
pˆ,
ˆˆp =
pˆ− (1− λβe∗)
λβ
= e+ θ +
1
β
u
which is constructed entirely from publicly available information (everybody ”knows” e∗ in equilibrium).
We again use result 1. Let Y1 = (si, ˆˆp) with mean µ1 = (e
∗, e∗) and Y2 = v with mean µ2 = e∗. The
covariance-variance matrices are:
Σ11 =
σ2θ + σ2ε σ2θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ +
1
β2σ2u

and Σ22 = σ2θ + σ
2
η, and Σ21 = Σ12 = (Cov[si, v], Cov[ˆˆp, v]) = (σ
2
θ, σ
2
θ).
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Hence
E[v|si, ˆˆp] = e∗ + (σ2θ, σ2θ)
σ2θ + σ2ε σ2θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ +
1
β2σ2u
−1µµsi
ˆˆp
¶
−
µ
e∗
e∗
¶¶
=
β2σ2εσ
2
θ
ˆˆp+ σ2uσ
2
θsi + σ
2
uσ
2
εe
∗
β2σ2εσ
2
θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
ε + σ
2
θ)
Substituting pˆ for ˆˆp and writing the expression in terms of precision τ j = 1/σ2j , we obtain:
E[v|si, pˆ] = τεsi + (β
2τu + τθ)pˆ
τε + (β
2τu + τθ)
Next we need to calculate
V ar[v|si, ˆˆp] = σ2θ + σ2η − (σ2θ, σ2θ)
σ2θ + σ2ε σ2θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ +
1
β2σ2u
−1µσ2θ
σ2θ
¶
=
β2σ2ητu + σ
2
ητε + σ
2
ητθ + 1
β2τu + τθ + τε
= σ2η +
1
τε + (β
2τu + τθ)
Last, substituting E[v|si, pˆ] and V ar[v|si, ˆˆp] = V ar[v|si, pˆ] into (10) yields
xi(si, pˆ) =
τε
r[σ2η(τε + β
2τu + τθ) + 1]
(si − pˆ)
and imposing β = τε
r[σ2η(τε+β
2τu+τθ)+1]
means that β must satisfy the condition stated in the proposition.
Proof of corollary 1: The equation in proposition 2 is of the form G(β, σ2u, σ2ε, σ2θ, σ
2
η, r) = 0 so that we can
use the implicit function rule to calculate ∂β
∂x
= −Gx
Gβ
where Gx is the partial derivative of G with respect to x.
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∂β
∂r
= − σ
2
uσ
2
θ
r2(3β2σ2εσ
2
ησ
2
θ + (σ
2
ησ
2
θ + σ
2
ε(σ
2
η + σ
2
θ))σ
2
u)
< 0
∂β
∂σ2u
=
β3σ2εσ
2
ησ
2
θ
σ2u(3β
2σ2εσ
2
ησ
2
θ + (σ
2
ησ
2
θ + σ
2
ε(σ
2
η + σ
2
θ))σ
2
u)
> 0
∂β
∂σ2θ
=
βσ2εσ
2
ησ
2
u
σ2θ(3β
2σ2εσ
2
ησ
2
θ + (σ
2
ησ
2
θ + σ
2
ε(σ
2
η + σ
2
θ))σ
2
u)
> 0
∂β
∂σ2η
= − β(β
2σ2εσ
2
θ + (σ
2
ε + σ
2
θ)σ
2
u)
3β2σ2εσ
2
ησ
2
θ + (σ
2
ησ
2
θ + σ
2
ε(σ
2
η + σ
2
θ))σ
2
u
< 0
∂β
∂σ2ε
=
(βrσ2η − 1)σ2θσ2u
rσ2ε(3β
2σ2εσ
2
ησ
2
θ + (σ
2
ησ
2
θ + σ
2
ε(σ
2
η + σ
2
θ))σ
2
u)
where the sign of the last derivative is equal to the sign of (βrσ2η − 1). We checked numerically that this
expression is negative for reasonable parameter estimates (in fact it was negative for all parameters that we
tried). This coincides with out intuition that traders with less precise information place less weight on their
private signal.
Proof of proposition 3: In choosing the effort level, the agent solves the following problem:
e = argmax
e0
E[I]− rm
2
V ar[I]− k
2
e02
where
E[I] = aˆ1 + aˆpE[pˆ] + aˆvE[v] = aˆ1 + aˆp (e
∗ + λβ(e− e∗)) + aˆve
and V ar[I] = aˆ2pV ar[pˆ] + aˆ
2
vV ar[v] + 2aˆpaˆvCov[pˆ, v] is independent of the actual choice of effort (i.e. the
manager can neither influence the fundamental risk of his environment nor the amount of noise trading). The
f.o.c. of this problem reads then
aˆpλβ + aˆv = ke
that is anticipated by the principal and the investors given the contract. Hence, by rational expectations:
e∗ : aˆpλβ + aˆv = ke∗
Since the principal is risk-neutral, the cheapest way to induce any equilibrium effort level is to minimize the
income risk borne by the manager. An optimal contract must therefore solve:
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min
ap,av
V ar[I]
s.t. aˆpλβ + aˆv = ke
∗
and the f.o.c.’s of this problem can be reduced to
aˆv[V ar[v]−Cov[pˆ, v]] = aˆp̂[V ar[pˆ]−Cov[pˆ, v]]
and rewritten as
aˆp̂
aˆv
=
∂E(p̂)
∂e
− Cov[pˆ,v]
V ar[v]
∂E(v)
∂e
V ar[pˆ]
V ar[v]
∂E(v)
∂e
− Cov[pˆ,v]
V ar[pˆ]
∂E(p̂)
∂e
=
λβ − λβσ2θ
σ2
θ
+σ2η
λ2β2σ2θ + λ
2σ2u
σ2θ + σ
2
η
1− λβσ2θ
λ2β2σ2
θ
+λ2σ2u
λβ
=
µ
β
λ
¶
σ2η
σ2u
Proof of Proposition 4: Applying the Projection Theorem:
E[v |bz1] = e∗ + bβ1σ2θbβ21σ2θ + σ2u (bz1 − bβ1e∗) = e∗ +
bβ1τubβ21τu + τθ (bz1 − bβ1e∗)
= e∗(1− bλ1bβ1) + bλ1bz1
= e∗(1− bλ1bβ1) + bλ1bβ1(e+ θ) + bλ1u1
with bλ1 = β̂1σ2θ
β̂
2
1σ
2
θ
+σ2u
and substituting for bz1 = bβ1(e+ θ) + u1. By semi-strong efficiency, bp1 = E[v |bz1] .
Analogously, calling τ1 = bβ21τu + τθ :
E[v |bz1, bz2] = e∗µ1− β̂21τu+(β2−β̂1)2τu
τθ+β̂
2
1τu+(β2−β̂1)
2
τu
¶
+ β̂1τu
τθ+β̂
2
1τu+(β2−β̂1)
2
τu
bz1 + (β2−β̂1)τu
τθ+β̂
2
1τu+(β2−β̂1)
2
τu
bz2
= e∗
µ
1− β̂
2
1τu+(β2−β̂1)
2
τu
τ2
¶
+ β̂1τu
τ2
³bβ1(e+ θ) + u1´+ (β2−β̂1)τuτ2 ³³β2 − bβ1´ v + u2´
= e∗(1− bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 − ³β2 − bβ1´ bλ2) + ³bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´bλ2´ (e+ θ) + bλ1 τ1τ2 u1 + bλ2u2
and again by semi-strong efficiency the REE normalized price in the second period is bp1 = E[v |bz1, bz2] .
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Proof of Proposition 5: The final wealth of agent i receiving signal si before the first round of trade is:
Wi3 = xi1(p2 − p1) + xi2(π − p2)
= xi1
µ bp2 − a0
(1 + a2)
− bp1 − a0
(1 + a2)
¶
+ xi2(v − a0 − a2p2 − p2)
= 11+a2 xi1 (bp2 − bp1) + xi2(v − bp2)
= bxi1 (bp2 − bp1) + xi2(v − bp2)
By backward induction, let us solve the problem at t = 2:
max
xi2
− exp(−rWi2)E [exp(−rxi2(v − bp2)) |si, bp2 ] (41)
where Wi2 = 11+a2xi1 (bp2 − bp1) is known at t = 2, given the observed bp2. Hence, the solution of (41)
corresponds to the solution of the one-period trading case illustrated in Proposition 1 with v = e+ θ and
si = v + ξi: xi2 = β2l(si − bp2) with β2l = τεr .
At t = 1 the optimal trading strategy solves:
max
xi1
E
h
exp(− r1+a2xi1 (bp2 − bp1))E [exp(−rxi2(v − bp2)) |si, bp2 ] |si, bp1 i
which is equivalent to
max
x̂i1
E [exp(−rbxi1 (bp2 − bp1))E [exp(−rxi2(v − bp2)) |si, bp2 ] |si, bp1 ]
and substituting for xi2 = β2l(si − bp2) we can rewrite it as:
max
xi1
E [exp(−rbxi1 (bp2 − bp1))E [exp(−rβ2l(si − bp2)(v − bp2)) |si, bp2 ] |si, bp1 ]
hence (see Vives (1995), proof of Proposition 4.1):
max
x̂i1
E
·
exp (−rbxi1 (bp2 − bp1)) expµ−12r2β22l (si − bp2)2τ2l + τε
¶
|si, bp1 ¸
⇒ max
x̂i1
E
·
exp
µ
−rbxi1 (bp2 − bp1)− 12r2β22l (si − bp2)2τ2l + τε
¶
|si, bp1 ¸
⇒ max
x̂i1
E
·
exp
µ
−r
µbxi1 (bp2 − bp1)− 12rβ22l (si − bp2)2τ2l + τε
¶¶
|si, bp1 ¸ (42)
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Vives (1995), shows that the solution to (42) is:
bxi1 = τε
r
(si − pˆ1) = bβ1l(si − pˆ1)
hence the optimal trading strategy for the long-term investor i at t = 1 is:
xi1 =
τε
r
(1 + a2)(si − pˆ1) = β1l(si − bp1)
Proof of Proposition 6: At time t = 2 the informed trader observes si and he solves:
Max
xi2
U i(W i2) = E [− exp(−r (xi2(π − p2))) |si, p1, p2 ]
where π = v − a0 − a2p2 is the liquidation value; hence:
xsi2 =
E [v − a0 − a2p2 − p2 |si, p2 ]
rV ar [v − p2 |si, p2 ] =
E [v − a0 − (1 + a2)p2 |si, p2 ]
rV ar [v − a0 − (1 + a2)p2 |si, p2 ] =
E [v − bp2 |si, p2 ]
rV ar [v − bp2 |si, p2 ]
which corresponds to the demand with long-term investors. Hence, we can write xi2 = β2si + ζ(bp1, bp2) and
βs2 = βstatic:
xsi2 = β2s(si − bp2) (43)
β2s = β2l =
τε
r
At time t = 1 the informed trader observes si and he solves:
Max
xi1
U i(W i1) = E [− exp(−r (xi1(p2 − p1))) |si, p1 ] =
= E
·
− exp
µ
−r
µ
xi1
µbp2 − a0
1 + a2
− bp1 − a0
1 + a2
¶¶¶
|si, bp1 ¸
= E
h
− exp
³
−r
³
xi1
1+a2
((bp2 − bp1))´´ |si, bp1 i
= E [− exp (−r (bxi1 ((bp2 − bp1)))) |si, bp1 ]
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Let ∆bβ = β2 − bβ1. Let us compute first (from Proposition 4):
bp2 − bp1 = −e∗ ³bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 +∆bβbλ2´+ e∗bλ1bβ1 + bλ1bz1 ³ τ1τ2 − 1´+ bλ2bz2
= e∗
³³
1− τ1
τ2
´ bλ1bβ1 −∆bβbλ2´−∆bβbλ2bλ1bz1 + bλ2bz2
= ∆bβbλ2 ³e∗ ³bλ1bβ1 − 1´− bλ1bz1´+ bλ2bz2
= bλ2bz2 −∆bβbλ2bp1
= bλ2 ³∆bβ (v − bp1) + u2´
so
E [(bp2 − bp1) |si, bp1 ] = bλ2∆bβE [(v − bp1) |si, bp1 ]
V ar [(bp2 − bp1) |si, p1 ] = bλ22 ³∆bβ2V ar [(v − bp1) |si, p1 ] + σ2u´
Using
E [(v − bp1) |si, bp1 ] = τεsi + τ1bp1
τε + τ1
V ar [(v − bp1) |si, p1 ] = 1
τε + τ1
and substituting into the demand:
bxi1 = E [(bp2 − bp1) |si, bp1 ]
rV ar [(bp2 − bp1) |si, p1 ] =
bλ2∆bβ ³ τεsi+τ1p̂1τε+τ1 − bp1´
rbλ22 ³∆bβ2 1τε+τ1 + σ2u´
=
bλ2∆bβ τετε+τ1 (si − bp1)
rbλ22 ³∆bβ2 1τε+τ1 + σ2u´
=
∆bβτε
rbλ2 ³∆bβ2 + (τε + τ1) 1τu´ (si − bp1)
=
τε
r
∆bβτubλ2 ³∆bβ2τu + τ1 + τε´ (si − bp1)
=
τε
r
∆bβτubλ2 (τ2 + τε) (si − bp1)
=
τε
r
τ2bλ2bλ2 (τ2 + τε) (si − bp1) = 1r τετ2(τ2 + τε) (si − bp1)
44
so that bβ1s = 1r τ2sτετ2s + τε
Proof of Corollary 2: (i) From the projection theorem, V ar[v |bz1, bz2] = 1τ2 = 1τθ+β̂21τu+(β2−β̂1)2τu thus
τ2 = τθ + bβ21τu + ³β2 − bβ1´2 τu
and computing this expression in the two cases with long and short termists:
τ2l = τθ +
³τε
r
´2
τu
τ2s = τθ + bβ21sτu + ³τεr − bβ1s´2 τu
so that
τ2l > τ2s ⇐⇒ bβ1s < τεr ⇐⇒ τ2sτ2s + τε < 1
which is always verified. Hence, V ar[v |bz1, bz2] is lower with long-termists.
Since V ar[bp2] = V ar(v)− V ar[v |bz1, bz2] the unconditional variance of bp2 is higher with long-termists.
(ii) Rewriting explicitly bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´bλ2 in the two cases with long and short termists:
bλ1sbβ1s τ1sτ2s + ³β2s − bβ1s´bλ2s = bβ
2
1sτu +
³
β2s − bβ1s´ τu
τ2s
= 1− τθ
τ2s
bλ1lbβ1l τ1lτ2l + ³β2l − bβ1l´bλ2l = bβ21lτuτ1l = 1− τθτ2l
since β2l = bβ1l thus τ1l = τ2l. But then, from point (i), 1− τθτ2l > 1− τθτ2s .
Proof of Proposition 7: Using the equality obtained above bλ1bβ1 τ1τ2 + ³β2 − bβ1´bλ2 = 1− τθτ2 in (40):
e∗ =
1
k
1
1 + krm
Var(p̂2)(
1− τθ
τ2
)2
=
1
k
1
1 + krm
1
τv
− 1
τ2(
1− τθ
τ2
)2
since bp2 = E(v |bp2 ) and τv = τθ (recall that v = e+ θ). This gives us:
e∗ =
1
k
1
1 + krm
1
τθ
− 1
τ2(
1− τθ
τ2
)2
(44)
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and the term
1
τθ
− 1
τ2(
1− τθ
τ2
)2 is decreasing in τ217 , so that e∗ is increasing in τ2. The result follows from Corollary 2
(i).
Proof of Proposition 8: Vives (1995), Proposition 5.1, shows that the precision of prices with short-term
investors increases with time: hence τ2s > τ1s. Moreover,bλ1sbβ1s τ1sτ2s + ³β2s − bβ1s´bλ2s = 1− τθτ2s > bλ1sbβ1s = 1− τθτ1s since τ2s > τ1s. Writing the optimal effort in the
two cases with contract written on bp1 and contract written on bp2, from (44) gives respectively18:
e∗(bp1) = 1
k
1
1 + krm
Var(p̂1s)
(λ̂1sβ̂1s)
2
e∗(bp2) = 1
k
1
1 + krm
Var(p̂2s)(
1− τθ
τ2s
)2
Simplifying:
V ar(p̂1s)
(λ̂1sβ̂1s)
2 =
1
τθ
− 1
τ1s(
1− τθ
τ1s
)2 =
τ1s−τθ
τθτ1s(
τ1s−τθ
τ1s
)2 = 1τθ τ1sτ1s−τθ = 1τθ
³
1 + τθ
τ1s−τθ
´
V ar(p̂2s)(
1− τθ
τ2s
)2 =
1
τθ
− 1
τ2s(
1− τθ
τ2s
)2 =
τ2s−τθ
τθτ2s(
τ2s−τθ
τ2s
)2 = 1τθ τ2sτ2s−τθ = 1τθ
³
1 + τθ
τ2s−τθ
´
Finally, since τ2s > τ1s,
V ar(p̂2s)(
1− τθ
τ2s
)2 < V ar(p̂1s)
(λ̂1sβ̂1s)
2 and the principal can optimally induce a higher effort writing a
contract with stock-appreciation rights based on bp2s.
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